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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STRUCTURAL INSPECTION
OF OLDER AIRCRAFT*
By Herbert F. Hardrath
Langley Research Center
INTRODUCTION
A large number of rather old (20 years, or over 40,000 hours of service) aircraft
are in the passenger and freight-carrying registry in the United States. Because of high
utilization, many of the newer jet aircraft are also approaching the same total number of
flight hours. Background information provided by the FAA to the members of its FAA-
Industry Advisory Group on Airworthiness of Older Aircraft indicates that a number of
nearly disastrous incidents have occurred in these aircraft. Because many of the older
aircraft were designed and constructed before fatigue life and fail-safe characteristics
were prime considerations, it is prudent to establish policies that will assure continued
airworthiness of these aircraft.
The state of the art of fatigue design is inadequate to allow a meaningful analytical
assessment of continued airworthiness of a given aircraft. Therefore, elaborate inspec-
tion programs have been instituted to detect incipient fatigue damage. A commendable
cooperation among the manufacturers, operators, and regulatory agency (FAA) has helped
to develop these programs for inspections and repairs that have been the key factors in
maintaining high reliability in operating aircraft. More recently, fail-safe considerations
have been introduced in design with additional mitigation of hazards due to moderate dam-
age. This general philosophy seems generally appropriate for the current state of affairs.
The overall successful experience of civil aircraft is ample proof that the policies adopted
have been effective.
The present paper is intended to point out some of the general considerations that
should be used to develop future airworthiness policies for older aircraft. The particular
topics to be treated include the most rational basis for measuring service usage, the influ-
ence of material and structural configuration on the rate of crack growth and residual
strength, and the need for occasional intensive inspections to supplement analyses and
extrapolations of past experience.
*This material was originally contained in an informal document presented at a
meeting of the FAA-Industry Advisory Group on Airworthiness of Older Aircraft in
December 1968.
THE CASE FOR MEASURING FATIGUE LIFE AND DAMAGE BY
FLIGHTS RATHER THAN BY HOURS
Traditionally, aircraft usage is recorded and discussed in terms of flight hours.
Flight loadings, on the other hand, are frequently reported on a per-mile basis. However,
since flight speeds are reasonably uniform for a specific airplane, the conversion from
one frame of reference to the other is direct.
Coleman (ref. 1) has examined a very broad range of data on frequency of occur-
rence of flight loads for a variety of commercial aircraft. One of his conclusions reads:
"For the wide range of airplanes and operations covered by the review, the in-flight accel-
eration histories have remained unexpectedly consistent when viewed on a per-flight
rather than on a per-mile basis. This consistency exists because most of the repeated
loads occur in the climb and descent phases of flight rather than during cruise. The
greater consistency of the acceleration histories on the flight basis suggests that per-
flight may be a better basis for fatigue assessment than the conventional per-mile basis."
Note: For this purpose, a flight includes all operations for one cycle of take-off, cruise,
and landing.
The data supporting this conclusion are documented in the reference. The basic
demonstration of the conclusion is in figure 1, which shows the same set of data on fre-
quency of occurrence of acceleration increments plotted on a per-mile and on a per-flight
basis. The narrower band in the "per-flight" diagram indicates the improved consistency
of the data when viewed this way.
Unpublished studies performed by the Airworthiness Branch of the NASA Langley
Research Center have indicated a consistent trend toward shorter average flights as air-
craft grow older. The prime reason for this trend is that newer, faster, larger aircraft
are used for long haul service and older aircraft tend to find their way into short haul or
feeder-line service. The impact of this trend combined with the better correlation when
loads are counted per flight is clear: Older aircraft must be accumulating more fatigue
damage per hour now than they have over most of their service to date. Thus, inspection
intervals should be reviewed and adjusted accordingly. The simplest method for insuring
against surprises is to base inspection intervals on the number of take-offs and landings
rather than on hours of service. Portions of some aircraft are already serviced on this
basis, so no new concepts are involved.
QUALITATIVE CONSIDERATIONS FOR ADJUSTING INSPECTION INTERVALS
In principle, structures should be inspected just often enough so that a crack too
small to be found on one inspection does not grow to critical size before the next inspec-
tion. The most rational basis for selecting inspection intervals is the fatigue crack prop-
agation curve. Figure 2 is typical of fatigue crack propagation curves observed in a wide
variety of tests and in service. Generally, a fatigue crack grows slowly for a reasonably
long time, the crack then accelerates, and finally fracture occurs.
The actual crack propagation curve for a specific station in an aircraft structure
is dependent upon a large number of parameters: the material, detailed configuration,
stress level, service loading, chemical environment, temperature, etc. Thus the behav-
ior of each station of an airframe is described by a different crack propagation curve.
Generally, these curves are not known with any useful precision for older aircraft. Ana-
lytical tools for computing such curves are being developed which could furnish.useful
guideline information. However, the analysis of a complete airframe requires a much
more detailed stress analysis than has been done on current aircraft. The formidable
cost of performing this analysis probably precludes its implementation. Thus, more
qualitative considerations and past experience must be employed to set inspection
intervals.
The general character of fatigue crack growth dictates that older aircraft must be
inspected frequently to avert rapid crack growth and fracture in service unless one can
guarantee that all potentially critical cracks are found at a very early stage. The occa-
sional discovery of a rather long crack that was not anticipated weakens the needed
guarantee.
The following sections treat several specific factors that must be considered in
establishing inspection intervals and procedures.
Crack Propagation in Various Materials
A very major factor in determining how rapidly a fatigue crack will grow and how
long it can grow before causing failure is the material from which the structure is con-
structed. In figure 3 are plotted the typical crack growth curves for tests of three alu-
minum alloys. The example is for simple sheet specimens of equal size subjected to the
same nominal stress conditions (R = 0, Smax = 20 ksi), but a similar comparison would
result for any other configuration as long as it was identical for each material and the
same nominal stress was applied to each.
Obvious from the curves is the fact that the higher strength materials experience
higher rates of crack propagation. Recent results obtained at Langley Research Center
indicate that the rate was between 2 and 6 times faster in 7075-T6 than in 2024-T3 for the
same stress. Further, it is well known that a given size crack reduces residual strength
more drastically in the higher strength material than in lower strength material. In the
figure, failure was calculated to occur when a single load producing 50 ksi gross tensile
stress was applied at just that instant when the crack was long enough to cause failure at
that stress. The trends indicated would be emphasized still more if the tests were con-
ducted at a stress level that was a given percentage of the original tensile strength.
These observations are not intended to condemn the use of high strength materials
generally, but rather to call attention to the fact that smaller cracks must be found in
such materials to preclude failure. Generally, more frequent inspections are also
required to be sure to catch cracks because of their faster rates of propagation. Obvi-
ously, if the higher strength alloy is being utilized at a low enough stress level, the impor-
tance of these considerations is reduced.
»
Integral Versus Redundant Construction
Figure 4 shows crack propagation curves for tests of two 7075-T6 aluminum alloy
box-beam structures having integrally stiffened and skin-stringer covers. The gross
area of each was the same, the stiffener spacing was the same, and both tests were con-
ducted at the same stress level (ref. 2). The much more rapid growth in the integrally
stiffened cover after the crack passed the first stiff ener is obvious. The integral stiff -
eners provided little or no crack-stopping resistance like that provided by riveted string-
ers. This observation suggests that integral construction should be inspected more fre-
quently than other types. Experience has also shown that integrally machined components
are vulnerable to corrosive attack because unfavorable grain structure is present at highly
stressed points and is exposed to the environment.
Compensating considerations are the following. Integral construction contains
fewer fasteners; thus fewer crack initiators are present. Integrally stiffened structures
are frequently made up of narrow panels so that a given crack is contained within one
panel which provides a smaller fraction of the total load-carrying capability of the struc-
ture. Integral construction frequently contains sculptured doublers that reduce the stress
level at critical fasteners and joints.
However, a crack, once started by fatigue, corrosion, or accidental damage, usually
has much more serious consequences in integral construction than in other types. Thus,
special care should be exercised in inspecting such structures.
/
Fail-Safety in Older Aircraft
Improvements in design procedures and the increased use of machining to provide
just enough structural material to carry the expected loads has led to more nearly uni-
formly stressed structure. Furthermore, as an aircraft sees more service, the more
critical areas are identified and repaired or reinforced. As a result, one might expect
cracks in more places in older aircraft so that the condition of the "one-hoss shay" is
approached. The rate of total fatigue crack growth under these circumstances is higher
because more cracks are working. Later, they may coalesce to suddenly form a rather
long crack where two or more short ones were a little earlier.
To the writer's knowledge, at least two full-scale fatigue tests have produced cata-
strophic failures because of this sequence of events and before any cracks were detected.
In at least one other case the progress of several cracks at a particular station at a wing
root was monitored and crack coalescence was observed. Some service failures have
been attributed to similar behavior.
On the other hand, fail-safe characteristics are usually demonstrated or calculated
on the basis of sound material everywhere except for that which was cracked or cut. A
critical look at the level of fail-safety present in "experienced" aircraft appears justified.
To the writer's knowledge the problem has not been studied to any significant extent, and
thus no rules are available at this time.
THE CASE FOR DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTARY TESTS
The foregoing discussions and recommendations are necessarily qualitative because
the current state of the art does not permit quantitative rules to be developed with useful
reliability. Continued inspections for cracks are the basis for maintaining integrity and
must remain so for the forseeable future.
However, the operator must make judgments on when and where to inspect specific
structures. To date he has guided his inspection procedures by previous experience -
his own and that of others inspecting the same type of structure. If one concedes that all
previously identified cracks are being handled adequately, he must still be concerned
about potential cracks that have not been identified to date. As aircraft grow older more
new cracks are bound to appear.
A destructive inspection of a high-time aircraft is considered to be the best and
most reliable source of information on potential crack sites. Previous experience with
such inspections raises questions about whether they uncovered enough new cracks to be
worthwhile. However, identification of any crack that could become critical would be
extremely valuable. Further, the absence of new cracks should be of tremendous value
in inspiring continued confidence in a given vehicle type. The cost of an airframe for
such an inspection should be small, because aircraft are occasionally retired after dam-
age too severe to warrant repair. The cost of the inspection is significant. For maxi-
mum benefit the inspection should be accomplished by the original builder or with his
intensive participation.
Selected parts of dismantled aircraft should be studied in the laboratory to develop
realistic estimates of how quickly a representative crack is likely to grow in that struc-
ture. These tests could also provide valuable information on possible changes (or4ack
thereof) in material properties and on fail-safe characteristics of the structure. Depend-
ing upon the results, fleet-wide reinforcements could be made or effective inspection
intervals could be prescribed. Some of the insight gained could be of benefit to future
designs.
CONCLUSIONS
A brief review of general considerations for inspection policies for older aircraft
leads to the following conclusions:
1. Aircraft usage and damage should be recorded and interpreted in terms of num-
bers of flights rather than in terms of time or distance flown.
2. Because of their higher rates of fatigue crack propagation and lower crack
strengths, structural components made of high strength materials require more frequent
and more diligent inspection than do parts similarly shaped and stressed, but made of
lower strength materials.
3. Similarly, integral and other nonredundant construction deserves more frequent
and diligent inspection than does multiple-load-path construction.
4. The fail-safety of structures potentially containing a number of cracks should
be assessed.
5. An occasional destructive inspection of a high-time airframe is recommended to
help identify potential cracks or to reinforce confidence in a given aircraft type.
6. Selected laboratory tests are recommended to obtain detailed information regard-
ing rates of fatigue crack propagation not available from any other source.
Langley Research Center,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Hampton, Va., July 5, 1973.
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Figure 1.- In-flight accelerations.
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Figure 2.- Typical fatigue crack propagation.
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Figure 4.- Fatigue crack propagation in 7075-T6 aluminum alloy box beams.
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